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LINCOLN 



AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF 



BY 



MAJOR-GENERAL FRANCIS V. GREENE, U. S. V. 



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[From SCRIBNER'S MAGAZINE, July, iqog— Copyright, icpq, by Charles Scribner's Sons\ 






ff^ith thf CnwpUments of the Auth 



oor 



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LINCOLN AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF 



By Major-General Francis V. Greene, U. S. V. 




MONG the manifold duties 
devolving upon Lincoln dur- 
ing the four years of his Pres- 
idency none exceeded in im- 
portance the exercise of his 
constitutional functions as 



campaign. Lincoln was elected captain, 
by a large majority, because he had "the 
necessary muscles and fighting pluck to 
whip any rough in his company." He 
maintained discipline by his strong right 
arm, and any man who could down him 
in a fair and square fight with his fists 



Commander-in-Chief of the army ; for mani- 
festly upon the success of the armed forces was welcome to the captaincy. But none 
in the field depended the issue of the mo- could. Among the many contrasts in 
mentous political questions at stake. It is Lincoln's career perhaps none is more 
the purpose of this article to examine the striking than that between his position as 
manner in which Lincoln performed these a captain and private in the motley col- 
military functions, and to venture an opin- lection of rough frontiersmen with whom 
ion upon it; partly from the technical he served in 1832, and his position as 



military stand-point, and partly from the 
larger, wider stand-point of political ex- 
pediency; and to support this opinion by 
Lincoln's own words, penned by his own 
hand, and showing in a most interesting 
manner the working of his brain. 

For various reasons it was not necessary 
for him to devote personal attention to the 
details of the other departments; but the 
operations of the army were in Lincoln's 
thoughts every waking hour for 1502 long 



Commander-in-Chief of nearly 1,000,000 
veteran soldiers in 1864. 

He had been President less than twenty- 
four hours when, on the morning of March 
5, he learned the precarious situation at 
Fort Sumter, then not publicly known. 
He at once called on General Scott for re- 
ports and advice, and on March 12 Scott 
stated in writing: "It is, therefore, my 
opinion and advice that Major Anderson 
be instructed to evacuate the fort . . . and 



days. Scarcely a day passed that he did embark with his command for New York. 



not visit the War Department or the houses 
of McClellan or Halleck; and hardly, if 
ever, a day that Stanton or Halleck did not 
visit the White House. The responsibility 
of military success or failure was on Lincoln, 
and he knew it. There were the Secretary 



Scott had served with distinction in the 
War of 181 2, had conducted a brilHant 
campaign resulting in the capture of the 
City of Mexico, was now the senior officer 
in the army, and the highest military 
authority in the land. Lincoln instantly 



of War, the General-in-Chief, the generals and wisely overruled him. For various 



in the field, the Committee on the Conduct 
of the War, with virile men like Ben W^ade 
and Zach Chandler as members, but the 
final arbiter was Lincoln. 

How, then, did he perform the duties of 
his military leadership, wisely or unwisely ? 
Was his military judgment sound or de- 
fective ? Let the facts, and his own words, 
speak for themselves. 

Little need be said of his brief service in 
the Black Hawk War of 1832, when, at the 
age of twenty-three, he served first as cap- 
tain of a company of mounted volunteers, 
and afterward, when this company was 
disbanded, as a private in Captain Iles's 
company until the close of the war. It was 
a hunting expedition rather than a military 



reasons, stated in his message to Congress 
of July 14, "this could not be allowed." 
Lincoln's orders were exactly the opposite, 
to organize an expedition for the relief of 
Fort Sumter; and no one worked more 
loyally to carry them out than General 
Scott. A few days later it was a question 
of Fort Pickens in Florida. Scott recom- 
mended that it be evacuated. Lincoln 
sought other advice, reached his decision 
that Fort Pickens should be re-enforced, 
and sent this order to Scott on Sunday, 
March 31: "Tell him that I wish this 
thing done, and not to let it fail unless he can 
show that I have refused him something he 
asked for as necessary." Scott, on receiv- 
ing the order, said in his sententious man- 
By tr?r>«5fer 

The Wh.-.e Ho--e 

March Srd, i^l3 



Lincoln as Commander-in-Chief 



ner, "Sir, the great Frederick used to say, 
'When the King commands, all things are 
possible.' It shall be done." It was done; 
and this fort never passed out of possession 
of the United States. The expedition to 
Fort Sumter failed, but through no fault of 
Lincoln. 

In the Bull Run campaign Lincoln again 
exercised his full authority. On June 29 
he received Scott's report, considered it, 
consulted with his cabinet, and made his 
decision. Scott advised that no forward 
movement be made until autumn and that 
the advance be then made down the Mis- 
sissippi. Lincoln overruled him and di- 
rected that an advance be made immedi- 
ately in Virginia. Scott, always the loyal 
subordinate, then submitted, with his ap- 
proval, the plan which McDowell had 
prepared, and Lincoln ordered it to be 
carried out. We have General Sherman's 
word for it that "it was one of the best 
planned battles of the war, but one of the 
worst fought." 

During the days which followed the dis- 
aster Lincoln gave his entire thought to the 
military problem. Scott and McClellan 
had both submitted large plans of cam- 
paigns, beginning on the Potomac or the 
Ohio and terminating on the Gulf of Mex- 
ico, but they were crude and undigested, 
and apparently made little impression on 
Lincoln's mind. By concentrated study and 
apparently with but little assistance from 
his technical advisers, he evolved these 
ideas and wrote them out in his own hand. 

"JULY 23, 1861 

"i. Let the plan for making the block- 
ade effective be pushed forward with all 
possible despatch. 

"2. Let the volunteer forces at Fort 
Monroe and vicinity, under General 
Butler, be constantly drilled, disciplined, 
and instructed without more for the 
present. 

"3. Let Baltimore be held, as now, with 
a gentle but firm and certain hand. 

"4. Let the force now under Patterson 
or Banks be strengthened and made secure 
in its position. 

"5. Let the forces in western Virginia 
act till further orders, according to instruc- 
tions or orders from General McClellan. 

"6. General Fremont push forward his 



organization and operations in the West as 
rapidly as possible, giving special attention 
to Missouri. 

"7. Let the forces late before Manassas, 
except the three months' men, be reorgan- 
ized as rapidly as possible in their camps 
here and about Arlington. 

"8. Let the three months' forces who 
decline to enter the longer service be dis- 
charged as rapidly as circumstances will 
permit. 

"9. Let the new volunteer forces be 
brought forward as fast as possible; and 
especially into the camps on the two sides 
of the river here. 

"JULY 27, 1861 

"When the foregoing shall have been 
substantially attended to: 

"i. Let Manassas Junction (or some 
point on one or other of the railroads near 
it) and Strasburg be seized, and perma- 
nently held, with an open line from Wash- 
ington to Manassas, and an open line from 
Harper's Ferry to Strasburg — the military 
men to find the way of doing these. 

"2. This done, a joint movement from 
Cairo on Memphis; and from Cincinnati 
to east Tennessee." 

No professional soldier or writer could 
state more precisely the military situation 
then existing or propose a sounder military 
plan. Lincoln had that faculty of intense 
application and clear insight, so rare that 
we call it genius; and he applied it as suc- 
cessfully to military affairs as to politics, 
notwithstanding the fact that he was, by 
instinct, a man of peace, and by training 
a lawyer, and that military problems never 
engaged his attention until he was fifty- 
two years old. 

His memorandum of July 23 and 27, 
1 86 1, was the first definite and coherent 
plan for the prosecution of the war. It 
emanated from his own mind and not 
from that of any of his generals. The in- 
strumentality necessary to carry it into 
effect — an organized, disciplined army with 
competent commanding officers — did not 
then exist. Both the army and the com- 
manders had to be evolved as the war 
progressed. The plan was interrupted and 
delayed, now by McClellan's unsuccessful 
movement by the Peninsula, now by the 
incapacity of Halleck on the Tennessee, 



Lincoln as Commander-in-Chief 



and Pope in Virginia in 1862, and again 
in 1862 and 1863 by inability to find the 
competent man to command the Army of 
the Potomac and by the brilUant cam- 
paigns of Lee and his great lieutenant 
Jackson. But Lincoln never swerved from 
his memorandum of July 27, 1861. He 
yielded his own judgment at times to that 
of professional soldiers. But finally he 
found in Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan 
the long-sought military commanders, com- 
petent for their tasks; and then so much 
of his plan as remained unexecuted was 
carried into effect. 

Immediately after Bull Run McClellan 
was placed in command of the Army of the 
Potomac, Scott remaining as general-in- 
chief until October when he retired and 
McClellan succeeded him in that office. 
For the next year, until McClellan was 
finally relieved of all active military duty, 
there was an incessant exchange of views 
between Lincoln and McClellan in the 
form of personal interviews, letters, orders, 
and reports. On August 4 McClellan 
submitted his report calling for a main 
army of 275,000 men under his own com- 
mand. In this he says: "I propose, with 
the force which I have requested, not only 
to drive the enemy out of Virginia and 
occupy Richmond, but to occupy Charles- 
ton, Savannah, Montgomery, Pensacola, 
Mobile, and New Orleans; in other words, 
to move into the heart of the enemy's 
country and crush the rebellion in its very 
heart." To Lincoln's more practical mind 
the thing to do was to attack and defeat 
the Confederate Army, facing them about 
twenty miles from Washington. Troops 
were coming forward at the rate of a regi- 
ment a day, and Lincoln argued that we 
had the greater number of men and that 
the enemy was at least no better organized, 
equipped, and drilled than we were. 
McClellan argued that the enemy had su- 
perior numbers (a complete error, as the 
records now plainly show) and that no 
movement could be made until his army 
was more fully (ever more fully) equipped. 
Autumn and early winter passed and Lin- 
coln could get nothing done. He hesitated 
to impose his own views upon professional 
soldiers, but finally he made his decision, 
and on January 27 issued a formal and 
peremptory order that "the 2 2d day of 
February, 1862, be the day for a general 



forward movement of the land and naval 
forces of the United States against the in- 
surgent forces; . . . that especially . . . 
the Army of the Potomac be ready to move 
on that day. ..." A few days later 
he followed this with a specific order to 
McClellan to seize and occupy a point 
on the railroad near Manassas Junction; 
which, of course, involved an attack on 
Johnston's army. The official records 
show that the Army of the Potomac num- 
bered on December 31, 1861, 183,207 offi- 
cers and men ^^ present for duty,'' and that 
on the same day Johnston's aggregate pres- 
ent was 63,409; and that about the time 
that Lincoln issued his order Johnston 
was called to Richmond and instructed to 
withdraw his army from Manassas. 

But McClellan instead of obeying the 
order asked for its suspension, and for 
further argument; and in the course of 
the argument Lincoln wrote this letter 
to McClellan on February 3, "You and 
I have distinct and different plans for a 
movement of the Army of the Potomac — 
yours to be down the Chesapeake, up the 
Rappahannock to Urbana, and across land 
to the terminus of the railroad on the York 
River; mine to move directly to a point on 
the railroads south-west of Manassas." 
McClellan replied on the same day in a 
letter of nearly four thousand words. It 
made no direct answer to Lincoln's ques- 
tions, but it contained these two sentences 
— "It is by no means certain that we 
can beat them at Manassas. On the other 
line, I regard success as certain by all the 
chances of war." Lincoln was not con- 
vinced, but he had no general of proved 
capacity to put in McClellan's place and he 
hesitated to impose arbitrarily on McClel- 
lan a plan which McClellan so obstinately 
opposed . The result was the disastrous Pen- 
insular campaign. 

Only a brief reference need be made 
to McClellan's insubordinate despatch of 
June 28, 1862, when, in the midst of de- 
feats, he said to Stanton, "the Government 
has not sustained this army. ... I owe no 
thanks to you or to any other persons in 
Washington. You have done your best to 
sacrifice this army." 

It would have been well for the discipline 
of every man then in uniform, high and low, 
and would probably have saved many a 
life and shortened the war, if Lincoln had 



Lincoln as Commander-in-Chief 



instantly telegraphed back placing McClel- 
lan in close arrest and assigning any one 
of his corps commanders to command the 
army. But that was not Lincoln's way. 
Instant decision was not his habit. His 
mental processes were slow — though sure. 
And thought of personal insult never in- 
fluenced him. On one occasion he went 
to McClellan's house and waited several 
hours to see him, only to have McClellan 
come in and go to bed without seeing the 
President at all. On another occasion, 
when AlcClellan failed to keep an ap- 
pointment at the White House, and the 
others, who had come, expressed their im- 
patience at McClellan's delay, Lincoln 
only remarked: "Never mind; I will hold 
McClellan's horse, if he will only bring us 
success." 

Such patience, such tolerance, such sac- 
rifice of self to anything that will help 
accomplish a supremely important result 
are the marks of a great soul, but not of 
a great soldier. His military perceptions 
were more accurate than those of any of 
his generals in independent command, ex- 
cept Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, and pos- 
sibly Thomas. But his self-effacement, 
his diffidence, his doubt whether the coun- 
try would sustain him, if he peremptorily 
asserted his opinions against those of his 
professional military subordinates, left the 
army with two heads or three heads or no 
head at all until the really efficient man 
was found in Grant. From this confusion 
and lack of unity of command came the in- 
decisive, inconclusive movements and bat- 
tles of the Army of the Potomac during the 
interval between McClellan's defeats on 
the Peninsula in 1862 and Grant's victories 
in the Wilderness in 1864. 

In the effort to find a man equal to the 
task of commanding the Eastern Army and 
of coping with Lee and Jackson, Lincoln 
brought from the West two generals who 
had had some measure of success there; 
and in July, 1862, Halleck was assigned 
as general-in-chief, in Washington, and 
Pope to command the Army of Virginia. 
Neither succeeded. Halleck was never 
more than an indifferent chief of staff to 
Lincoln, disliked and distrusted by all the 
generals in the field, and incapable of 
evolving and carrying on a definite plan 
of campaign. Pope was speedily driven 
back to Washington by the direct road and 



there met McClellan's army arriving from 
the Peninsula. Lincoln again turned to 
McClellan, who, in less than three weeks of 
September, 1862, brought Lee's invasion 
to a halt and fought a desperate battle with 
him at Antietam — the most valuable and 
effective eighteen days of McClellan's en- 
tire service. But then McClellan stopped, 
and Lincoln began again the weary argu- 
ment in favor of attack. After a personal 
visit to the army at the beginning of Octo- 
ber, six weeks after the battle, he sent 
through Halleck a peremptory order to 
attack Lee, and as this produced no effect, 
Lincoln wrote McClellan a letter on Octo- 
ber 13 which shows a marvellously accurate 
comprehension of the military situation at 
that time. 

"Are you not overcautious when you 
assume that you cannot do what the en- 
emy is constantly doing ? Should you not 
claim to be at least his equal in prowess, 
and act upon the claim ? As I understand, 
you telegraphed General Halleck that you 
cannot subsist your army at Winchester 
unless the railroad from Harper's Ferry to 
that point be put in working order. But 
the enemy does now subsist his army at 
Winchester, at a distance nearly twice as 
great as you would have to do without the 
railroad last named. He now wagons from 
Culpeper Court House, which is just about 
twice as far as you would have to do from 
Harper's Ferry. He is certainly not more 
than half as well provided with wagons as 
you are. . . . Again, one of the standard 
maxims of war, as you know, is to ' operate 
upon the enemy's communications with- 
out exposing your own.' You seem to act 
as if this applies against you, but cannot 
apply it in your favor. Change positions 
with the enemy, and think you not he would 
break your communication with Richmond 
in twenty-four hours? . . . You are now 
nearer Richmond than the enemy is by the 
route you can and he must take. Why can 
you not reach there before him, unless you 
admit that he is more than your equal on a 
march? His route is the arc of a circle, 
while yours is the chord. The roads are as 
good on yours as on his. ... If he should 
move northward, I would follow him closely, 
holding his communications. If he should 
prevent our seizing his communications and 
move toward Richmond, I would press 
closely to him, fight him, if a favorable 



Lincoln as Commander-in-Chief 



opportunity should present, and at least 
try to beat him to Richmond on the inside 
track. I say 'Try'; if we never try, we 
shall never succeed. ... If we cannot 
beat him when he bears the wastage of 
coming to us, we never can when we bear 
the wastage of going to him. ... As we 
must beat him somewhere or fail finally, 
we can do it, if at all, easier near to us 
than far away. ... It is all easy if our 
troops march as well as the enemy, and 
it is unmanly to say that they cannot do 
it." Unfortunately, the letter concludes 
with the sentence, "This letter is in no 
sense an order." 

As in July, 1861, so now again in Octo- 
ber, 1862, Lincoln thus elucidated the mili- 
tary principles applicable to the situation as 
it then existed in Virginia. Fifty-six days 
had elapsed since the battle of Antietam. 
It was, however, thirteen days longer be- 
fore McClellan began to cross the Potomac 
and five days additional before he finished 
crossing. Lincoln then decided that "if 
McClellan should permit Lee to cross the 
Blue Ridge and place himself between 
Richmond and the Army of the Potomac 
he would remove him from command." It 
was a fair test of McClellan's generalship 
as compared with Lee's. Within four da}'s 
after McClellan crossed the Potomac, Lee 
had come through the passes of the Blue 
Ridge and planted himself squarely in 
McClellan's path at Culpeper. McClellan 
was forthwith removed. 

In his intercourse with McClellan be- 
tween July, 1 86 1, and November, 1862, 
Lincoln constantly exhibited weakness in 
allowing McClellan to write him insubor- 
dinate letters, and in allowing him to act 
on plans which Lincoln did not approve, 
and in allowing him to remain inactive 
when every consideration, military as well 
as political, required vigorous action — 
such action as was shown by Grant and 
Sherman and Sheridan whenever they were 
in independent command. Whether such 
weakness on Lincoln's part was justifiable 
or otherwise is a large question, quite apart 
from the purpose of this article, which is to 
show the accuracy of Lincoln's judgment 
on purely military questions. 

During the short and disastrous period 
of Burnside's command of the Army of the 
Potomac, Lincoln exercised a less active 
control. Burnside's plans did not impress 



him favorably, but he seemed to desire to 
give Burnside a chance to prove his ca- 
pacity. When he proved the opposite Lin- 
coln relieved him. He chose for his suc- 
cessor the man who had most bitterly criti- 
cised Burnside — Hooker — and he wrote 
Hooker a memorable letter, censuring him 
for his criticisms of Burnside, expressing 
confidence in his skill, and assuring him of 
his support. On the nth of April Hooker 
submitted his plan. Lincoln's comment 
was as follows, "My opinion is that, just 
now, with the enemy directly ahead of us 
there is no eligible route for us into Rich- 
mond; and consequently a question of 
preference between the Rappahannock 
route and the James River route is a con- 
test about nothing. Hence our prime ob- 
ject is the enemy's army in front of us, and 
is not with or about Richmond at all, un- 
less it be incidental to the main object." 
He advised against "attacking him in his 
intrenchments," but preferred to "harass 
and menace him" so that he could "have 
no leisure nor safety in sending away de- 
tachments"; but "if he weakens himself, 
then pitch into him." 

Hooker's plan for Chancellorsville was 
a good one, and up to a certain point 
well executed. Then Hooker failed. Had 
Jackson or Sheridan had the execution 
of it, it would probably have resulted in 
a brilliant success. Before Hooker could 
make plans for another offensive move- 
ment Lee took the offensive, in the Get- 
tysburg campaign. Hooker proposed to 
attack his rear, first at Fredericksburg and 
later at Harper's Ferry. Lincoln disap- 
proved both; the first in his oft-quoted 
letter in which he expressed a well-known 
military maxim — against having an army 
divided by a non-fordable river — by his 
quaint illustration of "an ox jumped half- 
way over a fence and liable to be torn by 
dogs, front and rear, without a fair chance 
to gore one way or kick another." In the 
interval Hooker proposed to march to 
Richmond, which Lee's movement to the 
Shenandoah Valley had left unguarded. 
Tempting as this was, Lincoln's clear in- 
sight discarded it and he answered, June 
10, "I think Lee's army, and not Rich- 
mond, is your sure objective point . . . 
follow on his flank and on his inside track, 
shortening your lines while he lengthens his; 
fight him, too, when opportunity offers." 



Lincoln as Commander-in-Chief 



Hooker followed these instructions, and on 
the 27th of June approached the passes of 
South Mountain, intending to attack Lee's 
rear, in the vicinity of the ground where 
McClellan had fought the battle of Antie- 
tam the previous year. He telegraphed 
Halleck asking that the troops which gar- 
risoned Harper's Ferry, about 10,000 men, 
be placed under his orders. Halleck re- 
fused consent, and Hooker immediately 
asked to be relieved. Meade was assigned 
to command the Army of the Potomac in 
his place. 

In the telegram assigning Meade to 
command, Halleck said, "Harper's Ferry 
and its garrison are under your direct or- 
ders," thus giving Meade 10,000 men 
which the day before he had refused to give 
to Hooker. Meade was so surprised that 
he at once telegraphed Halleck, "Am I 
permitted to withdraw a portion of the 
garrison of Harper's Ferry?" and within 
three hours received the reply, "The gar- 
rison at Harper's Ferry is under your or- 
ders." Meade forthwith ordered its with- 
drawal. 

In this strange circumstance it does not 
appear that Lincoln had any part, though 
it is doubtful if Halleck acted without pro- 
tecting himself by the President's approval 
— perhaps obtained without full explana- 
tion. That it is impossible for an army to 
be successfully commanded in such man- 
ner does not admit of doubt. Lincoln was 
one day issuing orders through Halleck 
and the next day writing letters direct to 
Hooker, who in turn addressed his replies 
to the President. Hooker believed that 
Halleck deliberately intended to destroy 
his military reputation; and Halleck said 
that Hooker ignored him and that all he 
knew about the Army of the Potomac was 
what he could learn from the President. 
Lincoln, considered as a military man, is 
least satisfactory from the stand-point of 
discipline. Theoretically he understood 
its value, but practically he did not apply 
it, particularly in the higher ranks. If he 
could have given his whole mind to the 
military problem, either in the field or at 
Washington, studied it until he mastered 
it as he mastered every problem to which 
he gave his undivided attention, and issued 
positive instructions in order to give effect 
to his opinions, he would have made short 
work of such relations as existed between 



Halleck and Hooker, or of such inaction 
as followed after Antietam and after Get- 
tysburg. But he had always other prob- 
lems on hand in addition to the military 
problem, and at this particular time, in 
midsummer of 1863, his mind was filled 
with two subjects of transcendent import- 
ance. One of them was the Emancipation 
Proclamation, which, resolved on as a 
thank offering for Antietam, had been 
issued September 22, 1862, confirmed Jan- 
uary I, 1863, and now was just taking full 
effect. Would the country sustain him? 
It seems hard to realize now that in 1863 
the people of the North were so evenly 
divided on that question. The other sub- 
ject was the resistance to the draft (author- 
ized by the law of March 3, 1863), already 
ominous and soon to take the form of hor- 
rible riots in New York. Well might his 
tired brain refuse to penetrate the essential 
features of the military situation, when the 
highest political questions — his very own 
problems — absorbed the last drop of its 
energy. 

Whatever the cause, it is noticeable that 
from the time Lincoln ordered the removal 
of McClellan in November, 1862, until 
just after the battle of Gettysburg in July, 
1863, Lincoln gave no positive orders. 
He corresponded with the generals, dis- 
cussed military questions with them, and 
gave his opinions freely, but always quali- 
fied them with some such remark as, "This 
is a suggestion, not an order," "I suggest 
this plan, incompetent as I may be," "I 
leave this to the military men," and so 
on. Just after Gettysburg he believed that 
Lee's army could be practically destroyed 
before it crossed the Potomac, and he 
caused the most vigorous orders to be sent 
to Meade. Had Lincoln written these 
orders himself, in his own clear and vigor- 
ous style, quite possibly they would have 
spurred Meade to such exertions as would 
have caused the desired result — although 
Meade was hardly cast in heroic mould. 
But interpreted through Halleck they have 
a bombastic, hysterical sound which per- 
haps caused Meade to pay so little at- 
tention to them. July 7, "Push forward 
and fight Lee before he can cross the Po- 
tomac." July 8, "My only fear now is 
that the enemy may escape by crossing the 
river." July 9, "Do not be influenced by 
any despatch from here against your judg- 



Lincoln as Commander-in-Chief 



ment. Regard them as suggestions only." 
July lo, "I think it will be best for you to 
postpone a general battle until you can 
concentrate your forces." July lo, "Be- 
ware of partial combats. Bring up and 
hurl upon the enemy all your forces, good 
and bad." July 13, "Act upon your own 
judgment and make your generals execute 
your orders. Call no council of war. It is 
proverbial that councils of war never 
fight." July 14, "I need hardly say to you 
that the escape of Lee's army without an- 
other battle has caused great dissatisfac- 
tion in the mind of the President." 

When Meade received the telegram of 
July 14 he promptly asked to be relieved 
of the command; this was declined and 
a telegram sent to Meade expressing thanks 
for what he had done, and using the word 
"disappointment," in place of "dissatis- 
faction," to express the President's feeling 
in regard to the escape of Lee's army. 

Lincoln was indeed grievously disap- 
pointed; yet it must be acknowledged that 
the course he had pursued during the pre- 
vious six months had not been such as to 
breed commanders in the Army of the Po- 
tomac fit to cope with Robert E. Lee. To 
have a nominal general-in-chief and yet 
to carry on a correspondence with his sub- 
ordinates without his knowledge; to require 
the general in the field to submit his plans 
and then to send a reply expressing ap- 
proval or disapproval of it, but ending with 
the remark — repeated so often as to be- 
come almost a formula — "this is a sugges- 
tion only, not an order" — this is not the 
way in which military operations are suc- 
cessfully conducted. 

In the West Lincoln had practically the 
same difficulties on military questions as 
in the East. He first assigned Fremont 
to command at St. Louis and McClellan at 
Cincinnati; but Fremont soon showed in- 
subordination and a desire to settle the 
slavery question on his own account, and 
was superseded by Halleck; and when 
McClellan was brought to Washington, 
Buell took his place. Lincoln had clear, 
definite plans in his mind, as shown by his 
memorandum of July 27, "a joint move- 
ment from Cairo on Memphis and from 
Cincinnati on east Tennessee." There 
were good military reasons in support of 
both, for one would cut the Confederacy 



in two along the line of the Mississippi, and 
the other would break the railroad commu- 
nications of the Confederates between 
Chattanooga and Virginia. There were, 
moreover, political considerations of an im- 
perative character in favor of supporting 
the Unionists of east Tennessee and pos- 
sibly saving that State and Kentucky and 
the western part of Virginia for the Union. 
The autumn passed with nothing done, 
and on January i, 1862, Lincoln sent tele- 
grams and letters to Halleck and to Buell 
asking that they act in concert, Halleck 
against Columbus, on the Mississippi, and 
Buell against Cumberland Gap in east 
Tennessee. Halleck replied, stating that 
"it would be madness to attempt anything 
serious" with the force at his command, 
and that the President's plan was based on 
a "strategic error." On receiving this, 
Lincoln wrote on the back of it this melan- 
choly endorsement, "It is exceedingly dis- 
couraging. As everywhere, nothing can be 
done." On January 4 Lincoln again tele- 
graphed Buell about east Tennessee, 
"Please tell me the progress and condition 
of the movement in that direction. An- 
swer." Buell replied, "I hope to inaugu- 
rate it soon. . . . While my preparations 
have had this movement constantly in view 
o . , my judgment has from the first been 
decidedly against it." To which, on Jan- 
uary 6, Lincoln answered : ' ' Your despatch 

. . disappoints and distresses me. I have 
shown it to General McClellan who says he 
will write you to-day. I am not competent 
to criticise your views, and therefore what 

1 offer is in justification of myself. Of the 
two I would rather have a point on the rail- 
road south of Cumberland Gap than Nash- 
ville. First, because it cuts a great artery 
of the enemy's communication, which 
Nashville does not; and secondly, because 
it is in the midst of loyal people who would 
rally around it, while Nashville is not. 
Again, I cannot see why the movement in 
east Tennessee would not be a diversion in 
your favor rather than a disadvantage, as- 
suming that a movement toward Nashville 
is the main object. But my distress is that 
our friends in east Tennessee are being 
hanged and driven to despair, and even 
now, I fear, are thinking of taking rebel 
arms for the sake of personal protection. 
... I do not intend this to be an order 
in any sense, but merely, as intimated 



Lincoln as Commander-in-Chief 



before, to show you the grounds of my 
anxiety." 

This letter was sent by mail, but the fol- 
lowing day, January 7, Lincoln's feeling on 
the subject being so intense, he telegraphed 
Buell to name a day when he could move 
southward in concert with Halleck, adding, 
"Delay is ruining us and it is indispensable 
for me to have something definite." Simul- 
taneously a triangular correspondence by 
wire and mail was passing between McClel- 
lan, General-in-Chief, at Washington, and 
Halleck and Buell; as a result of whkh 
Halleck sent orders on January 6 to Grant, 
then commanding the district at Cairo, to 
"make a demonstration in force" in the 
direction of Forts Henry and Donelson, 
but "be very careful," the order said, "to 
avoid a battle. We are not ready for that." 
Grant received the order on the 8th and 
began the movement on the 9th; he made 
his "demonstration," the men being out for 
more than a week, "splashing through the 
mud, snow, and rain," and then brought 
his troops back to Cairo. He asked per- 
mission to go to St. Louis on military busi- 
ness, and on arriving there laid before Hal- 
leck a plan for the capture of Fort Henry 
and Fort Donelson. It was coldly received, 
and Grant returned to Cairo, as he says, 
"very much crestfallen." But a few days 
later, January 28, he ventured to send this 
telegram to Halleck, "With permission, 
I will take Fort Henry, on the Tennessee, 
and establish and hold a large camp there." 
Flag-Officer Foote, commanding the gun- 
boats on the river, backed him up with 
a similar despatch. Not being snubbed 
again, as he feared, on the following day, 
January 29, he sent a longer telegram ex- 
plaining his plan more in detail. On the 
30th Halleck granted his consent by wire 
and sent instructions by mail. Grant re- 
ceived them on February i. He sprang 
forward like a dog let out of leash. His 
troops moved on the 2nd, and, with the co- 
operation of Foote's gun-boats, took Fort 
Henry on the 6th and Fort Donelson on the 
1 6th, with the "unconditional surrender" 
of 15,000 Confederate soldiers, the capture 
of forty pieces of artillery and a large 
amount of stores, horses, mules, and other 
property. The Confederate line of defence, 
from Columbus to Bowling Green, having 
been pierced, the whole line was promptly 
abandoned and a new line taken up from 



Memphis to Chattanooga, one hundred and 
fifty miles to the south. 

Now, what does all this prove ? It seems 
to me to prove, beyond dispute, that on the 
military questions at issue on the opening 
of military operations in the West, Lincoln 
was right and his generals, McClellan, 
Halleck, and Buell, were wrong. 

First, Lincoln insisted on a movement 
southward by Halleck and Buell. Both 
said it could not be done because they had 
not enough troops, because such troops as 
they had were not properly equipped, 
drilled, and disciplined, because they had 
not enough arms, and because the roads 
were so bad. Grant proved he had enough 
troops for the work required, that the en- 
emy was at least as badly off as ourselves 
in equipmicnt, drill, disciphne, and arms, 
and that, bad as the roads were, they were 
not bad enough to prevent active military 
operations. That these things could be 
done was what Lincoln argued, over and 
over, in letters and telegrams to IMcClellan 
and Meade in the East, and to Halleck 
and Buell in the West. They always said 
"No"; but the instant Grant got permis- 
sion to try, he showed that the answer 
should have been "Yes." 

Second, Halleck told Lincoln and 
McClellan that Lincoln's plan was "bad 
strategy," McClellan was in doubt about 
it, and Buell's judgment was "decidedly 
against it." Grant showed that one part of 
it, the movement from Cairo toward Mem- 
phis, could be carried out with brilliant 
success, inflicting on the enemy his first 
defeat in the war, and breaking up his first 
line of defence in the West; and it must be 
remembered that the whole movement had 
its origin in Lincoln's letter and telegram 
to Halleck of January i. 

Third. As to the second part of it, the 
movement through Cumberland Gap to 
cut the railroad from Virginia and turn the 
enemy's flank, it was just such a movement 
as Lee and Jackson would have delighted 
in; and if intrusted to a competent com- 
mander, such as Sherman, there is no rea- 
son to doubt that it would have been a great 
success — as important as the capture of 
Fort Donelson, in a military sense, and 
even more important in a political sense. 
But Buell would not heed the President's 
suggestions. A force was sent against 
Cumberland Gap, but too small to accom- 



Lincoln as Commander-in-Chief 



plish anything permanent; and it was not 
until eighteen months later, in September, 
1863, that an adequate force under Burn- 
side carried the passes in the Cumberland 
Mountains and occupied Knoxville and 
other points in east Tennessee. 

If Lincoln had placed Grant in command 
of the Western armies in July, 1862, when 
Halleck was made general-in-chief, in- 
stead of in October, 1863, it would prob- 
ably have shortened the war by a year. 
But Halleck had prejudiced Lincoln against 
Grant. Instead of giving Grant full credit 
for Donelson, Halleck began intimating in 
his despatches to Washington that Grant 
had been guilty of disobedience of orders, 
absence from his command, etc. He was 
authorized at once to put Grant in arrest, 
but when Halleck looked into the matter, 
he found that he was mistaken, and^id'so 
to Grant and also to the Ad jutan}>^ General 
in Washington. Nevertheless, immedi- 
ately after the battle of Shilohj^when Hal- 
leck came from St. Louis to take personal 
command in the field. Grant was made 
"Second-in-command" — with no duties — 
and remained in that position so long as 
Halleck was in the West. When Halleck 
left for the East his command was split up 
into three independent armies, those of the 
Tennessee, Ohio, and Mississippi, under 
Grant, Buell, and Rosecrans; and these 
acted independently until after Grant had 
taken Vicksburg and Rosecrans had been 
defeated at Chickamauga more than a year 
later. Then everything in the West was 
put under Grant, to be succeeded by Sher- 
man when Grant was made general-in- 
chief, and everything went on to victory — 
Chattanooga, the relief of Knoxville, Nash- 
ville, the March to the Sea, and the surren- 
der of Johnston's army in North Carolina. 

In all of this it does not appear that Lin- 
coln took an active part. To Halleck be- 
fore or after Shiloh, or Corinth, to Grant 
before or after Vicksburg, to Buell on his 
retreat to Louisville, Lincoln's despatches 
are few in number, and give little in the 
way of instruction or even suggestion, ex- 
cept to reiterate his opinion that east Ten- 
nessee should be occupied. A telegram to 
Buell, dated October 19, 1862, signed by 
Halleck, but sent by the President's order 
and evidently in Lincoln's own words, con- 
tains this imperative command, "Your 
army must enter east Tennessee this fall." 



Not being heeded, Buell was superseded by 
Rosecrans ten days later. To Rosecrans, 
after he had succeeded Buell, Lincoln sent 
several despatches, first congratulating him 
on his victory at Stone River in January, 
1S63, then gently chiding him for his 
complaining telegrams, subsequently sug- 
gesting that he attack Bragg in order to 
prevent re-enforcements being sent to 
Johnston, and finally, when Rosecrans was 
overwhelmed at Chickamauga and shut up 
in Chattanooga, sending him encouraging 
and cheering telegrams. But, except for 
his never-failing insistence that east Ten- 
nessee be held, none of these despatches 
contain the closely reasoned thoughts 
which are found in his earlier communi- 
cations to McClellan. The period of Rose- 
crans's command was coincident with that 
of Hooker and Meade in the East — the 
same period of the Emancipation Procla- 
mation and the draft riots to which refer- 
ence has already been made. 

On the 29th of February, 1864, Congress 
passed an act reviving the grade of heuten- 
ant-general in the army, and within a few 
days Grant was appointed and confirmed 
to this office. On March 10 he was "by 
Executive Order assigned to command the 
Armies of the United States." It is stated 
in Nicolay and Hay that Lincoln neither 
advocated nor opposed this legislation. 
The bill was introduced by E. B. Wash- 
burne. Member of Congress from the 
Galena district in Illinois, an old political 
friend of Lincoln and a great admirer of 
Grant. Just why Lincoln was neutral in 
the matter does not appear. An ungracious 
comment in Nicolay and Hay reads as fol- 
lows: "Whether he was or was not the 
ablest of all our generals is a question 
which can never be decided. . . . Grant 
was, beyond all comparison, the most 
fortunate of American soldiers." There 
are no facts whatever to justify this depre- 
ciation. Grant owed his success solely to 
his clear-sighted appreciation of facts and 
to the tremendous energy and resourceful- 
ness with which he carried his plans into 
effect — as Sheridan expresses it, to "the 
manifold resources of his well-balanced 
military mind." 

Grant was ordered to Washington to 
receive his commission, and met Lincoln 
for the first time on March 8, 1864. Grant 



Lincoln as Commander-in-Chief 



says in his ''Memoirs" that both Stanton 
and Halleck cautioned him against giving 
the President his plans of campaign because 
Lincoln was "so kind-hearted that some 
friend would be sure to get from him all he 
knew " — a piece of advice which, in view of 
Lincoln's discretion and Grant's reticence, 
seems quite superfluous. Grant's only 
comment is that the President did not ask 
him for his plans nor did he communicate 
them to him — nor to Stanton or Halleck. 
Lincoln said to him that "all he wanted or 
ever had wanted was some one who would 
take the responsibility and act, and call on 
him for all the assistance needed," and he 
"pledged himself to use all the power of 
the government in rendering such assist- 
ance." In short, Lincoln believed that at 
last he had found the man competent to 
command the armies, and he promptly re- 
tired to the background, limiting his mili- 
tary activities to the still mighty task of 
giving Grant the full support of the gov- 
ernment in every branch. 

With the comprehensive, far-reaching, 
and correlated plans which Grant made in 
April, 1864, and with the manner in which 
he carried them out, it is not possible to 
speak here in detail. We are dealing only 
with Lincoln's relation to them. On the 
30th of April, four days before Grant 
crossed the Rapidan, Lincoln wrote to 
Grant, "Not expecting to see you again 
before the spring campaign opens, I wish 
to express in this way my entire satisfaction 
v^ith what you have done up to this time, 
so far as I understand it. The particulars 
of your plans I neither know nor seek to 
know. You are vigilant and self-reliant; 
and, pleased with this, I wish not to ob- 
trude any constraints or restraints upon 
you. ... If there is anything wanting 
which is within my power to give, do not 
fail to let me know it. And now with a 
brave army and a just cause, may God sus- 
tain you." The terrible lighting in the 
W'ilderness followed, and on the day of 
Cold Harbor (June 3) Lincoln, in dechning 
an invitation to attend a mass meeting in 
New York, wrote to the presiding officer, 
"My previous high estimate of General 
Grant has been maintained and heightened 
by what has occurred in the remarkable 
campaign he is now conducting, while the 
magnitude and difficulty of the task before 
him do not prove less than I expected." 



Grant telegraphed almost daily to Halleck, 
and Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary 
of War, was at Grant's head-quarters, and, 
with the trained skill of a journalist, was 
sending almost hourly telegrams to Stan- 
ton. But Lincoln answered only once. 
At 7 A. M. on June 15 he saw Grant's tele- 
gram to Halleck, sent from Bermuda Hun- 
dred the previous day, saying, " Our move- 
ment from Cold Harbor to the James River 
has been made with great celerity and so 
far without loss or accident." Then Lin- 
coln sent this cheery message, "I begin to 
see it. You will succeed. God bless you 
all." 

But when Early was approaching Wash- 
ington on July 9, Grant telegraphed Hal- 
leck that if the President desired him to 
come to Washington in person he could 
"leave everything here on the defensive" 
and come on an hour's notice. Lincoln re- 
plied the following day, explaining what 
Halleck told him about the small force 
available for the defence of Washington 
and Baltimore, and adding, "Now, what 
I think is, that you should provide to retain 
your hold where you are, certainly, and 
bring the rest with you personally, and 
make a vigorous effort to destroy the ene- 
my's forces in this vicinity. I think there 
is really a fair chance to do this, if the 
movement is prompt. This is what I 
think upon your suggestion, but it is not 
an order." But late that night Grant re- 
plied to Lincoln telling him what troops 
he had sent to W^ashington and said: "I 
think, on reflection, it would have a bad 
effect for me to leave here. ... I have 
great faith that the enemy will never be 
able to get back with much of his force," 
and Lincoln replied, "Very satisfactory." 
But the pursuit of Early was feeble and 
he remained in the Shenandoah Valley. 
Grant then sent Sheridan to Washington 
and told Halleck (August i), "I want 
Sheridan put in command of all the troops 
in the field, with instructions to put him- 
self south of the enemy, and follow him to 
the death. Wherever the enemy goes, let 
our troops go also." Lincoln saw this 
despatch, and immediately sent Grant this 
characteristic reply: "This, I think, is ex- 
actly right as to how our forces should 
move; but please look over the despatches 
you may have received from here, even 
since you made that order, and discover, if 



Lincoln as Commander-in-Chief 



you can, that there is any idea in the head 
of any one here of ' putting our army 
south of the enemy,' or of following him to 
the 'death' in any direction. I repeat to 
you, it will neither be done nor attempted, 
unless you watch it every day and hour, 
and force it." This was savage language 
for a gentle President to use about his own 
Secretary of War and Chief of Staff, but 
doubtless it was deserved. Grant's answer, 
the same day, was brief, " I will start in two 
hours for Washington and will spend a day 
or two with the army under General Hunt- 
er." He did not, however, go to Washing- 
ton, but went direct to General Hunter's 
head-quarters at Monocacy, relieved Hunt- 
er, telegraphed Sheridan to join him at once, 
and on Sheridan's arrival placed him in 
command. Grant met Sheridan at the sta- 
tion and remained only long enough to give 
him his orders, and then returned to Peters- 
burg in order to attack Lee and prevent re- 
enforcements being sent to Early. The re- 
sult was Sheridan's brilliant campaign in 
the Shenandoah Valley and his complete 
defeat of Early's army two months later. 

In all this how similar are Lincoln's de- 
spatches to those he had sent in the previous 
years to McClellan and Meade and Halleck 
and Buell, and how different the result! 
And what hearty support on Lincoln's part 
is shown in this despatch of August 1 7 to 
Grant, "I have seen your despatch express- 
ing your unwillingness to break your hold 
where you are. Neither am I willing. Hold 
on with a bulldog grip, and chew and choke 
as much as possible." 

Sheridan's campaign in the valley was, 
however, no holiday affair, and on two occa- 
sions in September Lincoln telegraphed to 
Grant expressing his anxiety. The second 
despatch, September 29, is very charac- 
teristic — "I hope it will have no constraint 
on you, nor do harm anyway, for me to say 
I am a little afraid lest Lee sends re-en- 
forcements to Early, and thus enable him 
to turn upon Sheridan." To which Grant 
replied the same afternoon, "I am taking 
steps to prevent Lee sending re-enforce- 
ments to Early by attacking him here." 
The result was a two days' battle, Fort 
Harrison on the right and Poplar Spring 
Church on the left — names almost forgotten 
in the almost continuous fighting around 
Petersburg, but involving a loss of more 
than 6,200 men on these two days. 



And so the death struggle around Peters- 
burg continued during the winter, to end 
at Appomattox in the spring. To Grant, 
Lincoln sent no military despatches subse- 
quent to the one of September 29, above 
quoted. To Sherman he sent nothing ex- 
cept a warm-hearted, generous, and most 
flattering message of congratulations when 
his March to the Sea terminated at Savan- 
nah; to Thomas, only a similar but more 
guarded telegram after the battle of Nash- 
ville; to Banks, a message in December, 
1864, refusing to grant an important re- 
quest of Banks's because "he whom I must 
hold responsible for military results is not 
agreed"; to the other generals, nothing at 
all except on civil matters. But if Lincoln 
abstained from suggestions on purely mili- 
tary movements, he never for an instant 
relaxed his grasp of supreme control of the 
military situation. There is an imperative 
tone in his despatch to Grant of February 
I — at the time the Confederate Peace 
Commissioners had reached Grant's head- 
quarters — "Let nothing which is transpir- 
ing change, hinder, or delay your military 
movements or plans "; and again on March 
3, when Stanton sent this telegram, "The 
President directs me to say that he wishes 
you to have no conference with General 
Lee unless it be for capitulation of General 
Lee's army, or on some minor or purely 
military matter. He instructs me to say 
that you are not to decide, discuss, or confer 
upon any political questions. Such ques- 
tions the President holds in his owti hands, 
and will submit them to no military confer- 
ences or conventions. Meanwhile, you are 
to press to the utmost your military advan- 
tages." Grant welcomed such instruc- 
tions which defined his duties so clearly, 
and he carried them out in letter and spirit, 
assuring Stanton "that no act of the enemy 
will prevent me from pressing all advan- 
tages gained to the utmost of my ability. 
Neither will I, under any circumstances, 
exceed my authority, or in any way embar- 
rass the government." It was a grave 
oversight on the part of Lincoln, Stanton, 
and Grant that no copy of these explicit 
instructions of March 3 were sent to 
Sherman, then commanding a separate 
army in North Carolina and liable at any 
moment to be confronted with the problem 
of what terms of surrender he should offer 
Jolmston. That Sherman made a mistake 



Lincoln as Commander-in-Chief 



when the contingency of Johnston's sur- 
render arrived, after Lincoln's death, is 
universally conceded; but neither Lincoln, 
Stanton, nor Grant can escape their share 
of responsibility for it, in not sending him 
the same positive directions that were sent 
to Grant. 

In January, 1865, Lincoln wrote to 
Grant a most delightfully courteous and 
modest letter in regard to his son Robert, 
then twenty-two years old, recently gradu- 
ated from Harvard, and desirous "to see 
something of the war before it ends. . . . 
Could he, without embarrassment to you 
or detriment to the service, go into your 
military family with some nominal rank, 
I, and not the public, furnishing his nec- 
essary means? If no, say so without the 
least hesitation, because I am as anxious 
and as deeply interested that you shall not 
be encumbered as you can he yourself." 
Grant instantly replied, "I will be most 
happy to have him in my military family in 
the manner you propose," and suggested 
that he be given the rank of captain. He 
was accordingly appointed captain and 
aide-de-camp, and joined Grant on Feb- 
ruary 21. This circumstance — and per- 
haps others — led Grant to send a telegram 
to Lincoln on March 20: "Can you not 
visit City Point for a day or two? I would 
like very much to see you, and I think the 
rest will do you good." Lincoln accepted 
the invitation and arrived on March 24. 
He remained at City Point, living on the 
steamer River Queen, fourteen days, until 
Friday, April 7. He had long talks with 
Grant; he visited the troops, saw a battle 
in progress, met General Sherman and 
Admiral Porter, who came to consult 
Grant, entered Richmond on April 4. 
Nicolay and Hay speak of his "enjoying 
what was probably the most satisfactory 
relaxation in which he had been able to in- 
dulge during his whole ^Presidential ser- 
vice." 

On March 29 Grant started with his 
army on the Appomattox campaign. He 
kept Lincoln well advised by telegrams of 



the progress of events, and Lincoln an- 
swered him: "Having no great deal to do 
here, I am sending the substance of your 
despatches to the Secretary of War." Lin- 
coln, in fact, turned correspondent, and 
every day for a week reported to Stanton 
the progress of the day's battle or march — 
short, but clear, incisive despatches, giving 
a distinct account of what was happening. 
On the 7th of April Lincoln started down 
the James River on his return to Washing- 
ton. But early in the morning he received 
a telegram sent by Grant about midnight 
repeating Sheridan's report of the battle 
of Burkesville, April 6. Sheridan con- 
cluded with the words: "If the thing is 
pressed, I think Lee will surrender." Lin- 
coln answered Grant at 11 A. M. April 7, 
"Gen. Sheridan says, 'If the thing is 
pressed, I think that Lee will surrender.' 
Let the thing be pressed." Lincoln then 
proceeded to Washington. It was his last 
military order. Eight days later he was 
dead. 

As time goes on Lincoln's fame looms 
ever larger and larger. Great statesman, 
astute politician, clear thinker, classic 
writer, master of men, kindly, lovable man. 
These are his titles. To them must be 
added — military leader. Had he failed in 
that quality, the others would have been 
forgotten. Had peace been made on any 
terms but those of surrender of the insur- 
gent forces and restoration of the Union, 
his career would have been a colossal fail- 
ure and the Emancipation Proclamation 
a subject of ridicule. The prime essential 
was military success. Lincoln gained it. 
Judged in the retrospect of nearly half a 
century, with his every written word now 
in print and with all the facts of the period 
brought out and placed in proper perspec- 
tive by the endless studies, discussions, and 
arguments of the intervening years, it be- 
comes clear that first and last and at all 
times during his Presidency, in military 
affairs his was not only the guiding but the 
controlling hand. 






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